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Leaving the “Real Hume” in Peace and Reading the Dialogues from a Moral 
Perspective 
 





This paper offers a new reading of Hume’s much discussed Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion (1779/2000) which shows that, in contrast to what commentators tend to ascribe to 
Hume, the crux of the text is not epistemological-ontological – that is, not the arguments in favour 
of and against God’s existence – but moral. It is shown that, although most of the epistemological-
ontological pro-and-contra arguments are quite weak, Hume’s interlocutors nevertheless cling to 
their theses from beginning to end, with the reason for their dogmatism shown to be moral rather 
than epistemological-ontological. The paper is divided into four sections. The introduction to the 
argument is followed by a discussion of Hume’s rejection of substance as epistemologically-
ontologically superfluous and as morally bad. Thereafter, it is first shown how the concept of a 
transcendental God undergoes deflation and consequently disappears. It is then shown that, even 
though their arguments are wrong, Cleanthes and Philo cling dogmatically to their starting points 
instead of trying to improve their claims and to rebuff the criticisms made against them. In 
conclusion, it is shown that the only way to account for their dogmatic inflexibility is in terms of 
their moral position: Cleanthes thinks that society and morals will collapse without the belief in a 






As is the case with many such essays which have 
become popular common property, David Hume’s 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779/ 
2000a) is surrounded with the usual clichés 
acclaiming the fine literary style, the forerunner of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, the philosopher who 
has killed once and for all the argument from design, 
and so on. There are three fictional interlocutors in 
the Dialogues – Cleanthes, Demea and Philo – who 
discuss inter alia scepticism, the arguments in favour 
of and against God’s existence, the problem of evil, 
and the true religion. Another favourite activity in the 
research on Hume is to get Hume out of the closet, as 
it were, by finding out where the “real Hume” hides – 
under the guise of Cleanthes, Demea or Philo?1 In my 
opinion, all the interlocutors bear some similarity to 
Hume, and yet we cannot identify any of them with 
him. Philo is too sceptical to represent the real 
Hume.2 His bizarre theory of finite material in infinite 
time runs counter to what Hume says in the Treatise 
                                                 
1 O’Connor (2001, pp. 214ff) proves that Hume is being 
represented by Philo. Kemp Smith (1948, pp. 57-75) does a 
great job to prove that Philo speaks for Hume. Tweyman 
(1986, pp. 124ff) is of the same opinion. He claims that 
Philo represents Hume’s mitigated scepticism. Penelhum 
(2000, p. 200) is of a similar opinion although he does not 
explicitly identify Philo with Hume.    
2 See Cleanthes’s critique and mockery of Philo’s 
scepticism in Dialogue I, for example.  
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(1739-40/2003a, pp. 21ff).3 Demea is too dogmatic and 
orthodox to represent Hume, but his conception of the 
human mind (1779/2000a, pp. 217-218) reminds us of 
Hume’s views on the subject. Cleanthes seems to hold 
a good balance between sceptical caution and support 
of modern scientific progress. But he differs from 
Hume’s views by going beyond the order he discerns 
in nature, namely the scope of what Hume calls 
“experience”, and trying to infer the existence of God 
from it.4  
 
The attitude of commentators such as Kemp Smith 
(1848), Penelhum (2000), O’Connor (2001) and 
Gaskin (1988) towards the text is an epistemological-
ontological one. That is to say, they deal with the 
merits of the arguments in favour of and against the 
existence of God. Then they go on to compare the 
different epistemological-ontological approaches 
presented in the course of the Dialogues with Hume’s 
own approaches in order to find which fictional figure 
represents Hume.  
 
In my opinion, the arguments of the interlocutors are 
mostly very weak. The interlocutors fail time and 
again to articulate them logically and either to defend 
them or to refute the opposing arguments. Instead, 
they cling stubbornly to their fixed opinions from the 
beginning to the end. It therefore seems to me that the 
epistemological-ontological attitude is a bad strategy 
for approaching the text. First of all, it is not 
especially interesting to work with weak arguments 
that the interlocutors do not really make much effort 
to defend and to improve. Secondly, it would be much 
more interesting to ask why the interlocutors so 
doggedly reiterate their weak arguments. From the 
epistemological-ontological point of view, only the 
static facet of the text is seen while the dynamic facet 
is totally overlooked. It seems to me that it is only by 
asking why the interlocutors remain so dogmatically 
loyal to their positions that we can uncover the 
dynamic aspect of the text. Thirdly, by taking it one 
step further and asking who is the real Hume of the 
Dialogues, one makes the bad even worse. For once 
we know who is Hume in the Dialogues, the text 
loses its interest and becomes redundant, as is the 
case with Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous and Leibniz’s New Essay on Human 
                                                 
3 Note, in particular, p. 23: “The infinite divisibility of 
space implies that of time …” 
4 On the one hand, Cleanthes attacks Demea’s mysticism in 
Dialogues III-IV and the ontological argument in Dialogue 
IX. He speaks for the deistic attitude towards God, which is 
supposed to fit well into the scientific worldview. He is also 
up-to-date with the scientific tendencies of his days: 
Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton. He wants, however, to 
extend the analogy beyond the range of our experience to 
the transcendental realm.  
Understanding where we know from the outset which 
interlocutor represents the author. Fourthly, and most 
importantly for my reading, in the course of the 
Dialogues the transcendental substance undergoes a 
deflation until it totally evaporates. So, once the issue 
of the metaphysics has disappeared, it becomes futile 
to put all the money on the metaphysical horse. As I 
will show, the real matter in the Dialogues is the 
moral issue.   
 
In what follows, I offer a fresh and new reading of the 
Dialogues. Instead of the epistemological-ontological 
approach to the text I will offer a moral one. I will 
claim that the interlocutors stay dogmatically faithful 
to their epistemological-ontological viewpoint all 
through the Dialogues only because of their moral 
views. As I will show, both Cleanthes and Philo fail 
many times to defend their own philosophical claims 
and to refute the other’s, staying faithful to their 
epistemological-ontological starting point only 
because of moral considerations. Cleanthes remains 
faithful to the assumption of a transcendental God – 
not because he succeeded in pursuing and proving 
this assumption, but because he thinks that it would 
be morally wrong to give up this idea, with the 
epistemological-ontological issue remaining for him 
secondary and not crucial. Philo, on the other hand,  
remains faithful to his idea of an inherent principle – 
not because he succeeded in establishing it 
epistemologically-ontologically, but rather because he 
thinks that a transcendental substance must have a 
very bad moral influence on our culture and conduct.      
   
Livingston (1986) offers us a sober and clever way to 
approach Hume. Livingston shows that, according to 
Hume, religion is a branch of philosophy (or, more 
specifically, metaphysics) in that it has as its basis the 
same principles as those underlying philosophy. 
These are the principles of ‘ultimacy’ and ‘autonomy’ 
(ibid., pp. 34ff) – that is to say, the principle of the 
autonomy of pure mind and the principle of ultimate 
first and true cause to which everything is to be traced 
back. Anything else apart from this true first cause 
(i.e. the realm of ideas) is illusion. The craving to 
reach both principles, or ideals, Livingston goes on to 
say, leads us to ignore the socio-cultural context in 
which we are embedded and to want to overcome the 
limits of our finite impure mind. This religion-
metaphysics, Livingston continues, is false in that it 
promises us ideals lying out of our reach, namely the 
autonomy of mind and realm of pure thought. Its 
inability to fulfil its promise leads to scepticism. 
Livingston takes the trouble to show that Hume sets 
in place of the false religion-philosophy the true 
religion-philosophy. This alternative religion is true, 
for it does not leave the realm of experience. It does 
not set ideals such as a pure and free mind and first 
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ultimate cause. In order to achieve these ideals, the 
human understanding would have to extrapolate 
beyond the realm of experience, and the outcome 
would be a radical scepticism. I find Livingston’s 
reading very fruitful, for it fits in well with the 
Humean metaphysical and moral context. 
 
I would like to take Livingston’s thesis a few steps 
further and put it in my own words. On the one hand, 
we render correctly Hume’s sceptical facet by leaving 
aside the transcendental substance, since it is 
something we can never access or achieve with our 
conceptual means (Hume, 1739-40/2003a, pp. 11ff). 
On the other hand, the call to adhere to our experience 
mitigates Hume’s scepticism, reflecting his awareness 
that extreme scepticism cannot be adequately held 
due to the dominance of our unreflective bestial 
instincts and desire to survive. This is a fair 
interpretation of Hume’s philosophy of mind no less 
than of his philosophy of religion and his moral 
philosophy.  
 
In what follows, I am going to develop this line of 
thought. I will show that, although the arguments on 
both sides are far from being convincing, the outcome 
of the discussions in the Dialogues is the deflation 
and evaporation of the concept of pure mind, of God 
as the first pure substance. The climax of this process 
is Dialogue XII, in which Cleanthes and Philo discuss 
true religion5. It is the highest point, because it shows 
us why they both so doggedly adhered to their 
metaphysical-philosophical fixed ideas throughout the 
Dialogues even though they failed to defend their 
theses. Cleanthes continues to argue in favour of a 
transcendental substance because he thinks that 
without it our moral nature and society will collapse. 
Philo, on the other hand, believes that transcendental 
substance is the origin of all the moral and social (as 
well as metaphysical) problems we encounter. By this 
new reading of the Dialogues, I shift the attention 
from the static to the dynamic facet of the text: the 
issue at stake is not the knockout arguments about 
God’s existence, but rather an open discussion about 
society with or without religion based on a 
transcendental substance.  
 
In the next section, I will discuss Hume’s thesis, 
according to which the transcendental substance is 
                                                 
5 The shift from design with to design without designer can 
be carried out more smoothly than between a transcendental 
God and a universe without God. This is the reason why 
Demea – who both believes in a transcendental God and yet 
insists on our basic ignorance regarding the true nature of 
God – must leave the rest of the discussion to the two other 
interlocutors who respectively represent design with 
(Cleanthes) and design without (Philo) designer.   
both epistemologically-ontologically superfluous and 
morally bad. In the section thereafter, I will focus on 
some arguments by Cleanthes and Philo. I will show 
that none of them is logically good and compelling. I 
will show how easy it is to find alternative, and better, 
replies and critiques. I will show that, although the 
arguments are mostly clumsy and inept, the outcome 
of the discussion is deflation and removal of the 
transcendental substance from the arena. In the 
concluding section, I will explain why the 
interlocutors hold dogmatically to their starting points 
even though they fail time and again to defend their 




Locke’s nominalistic influence and Hume’s own 
decision in the first book of the Treatise to depend 
only on what is given in the realm of sense data 
(which Hume calls “perceptions”) led Hume to 
discard the metaphysical concept of substance as that 
which stands beyond the particular characteristics of 
the object.6 On the epistemological level, the concept 
of substance thus makes no contribution towards 
explaining the surrounding world and can only cause 
unneeded perplexity and obscurity due to “evident 
contradictions” (Hume, 1739-40/2003a, p. 157).  
 
But these philosophers carry their fictions 
still farther in their sentiments concerning 
occult qualities, and both suppose a 
substance supporting, which they do not 
understand, and an accident supported, of 
which they have as imperfect an idea. The 
whole system, therefore, is entirely 
incomprehensible … . (ibid., p. 159) 
 
Now, according to Hume, there is in principle nothing 
wrong with fantasies (even if we cannot account for 
them epistemologically) as long as they promote and 
ensure our survival and well-being. But, apart from 
the positive fantasies, there are some other fantasies 
which are simply futile, because they are not only 
epistemologically occult, as Hume puts it, but are also 
not necessary for our survival: the former regarding 
causes and effects, and the latter regarding substance.  
 
… I must distinguish in the imagination 
betwixt the principles which are permanent, 
irresistible, and universal; such as the 
                                                 
6 It is a fact that Hume does not adhere to the sense data 
theory, as I have shown elsewhere (Segev, 2008). Locke’s 
nominalism suffices, however, to discard the traditional 
concept of substance; we are used or conditioned to see 
different qualities occurring together. Hence we conclude 
that they are predicates of some unseen substance.  
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customary transition from causes to effects, 
and from effects to causes: And the 
principles, which are changeable, weak, and 
irregular … . The former are the foundation 
of all of our thoughts and actions, so that 
upon their removal human nature must 
immediately perish and go to ruin. The 
latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, 
nor necessary, or so much as useful in the 
conduct of life; but on the contrary are 
observ’d only to take place in weak minds, 
and being opposite to the other principles of 
custom and reasoning … . (ibid., p. 161)  
 
Hume (ibid., pp. 162ff) goes on to criticize and to 
show the absurdity stemming from Descartes’s 
inadequate undertaking to distinguish between 
primary (i.e. substantial) and secondary (i.e. non-
substantial) qualities, as well as from Descartes’s 
claim that only the primary are true. Hume (ibid., pp. 
171ff) turns next to the additional obscurity created 
by Spinoza’s monism. While Spinoza aspires to trace 
everything back to one substance, Descartes 
postulated three: expanding substance, thinking 
substance, and God.  
 
What do we derive from this “substance” philosophy? 
Above all, an extreme scepticism that nobody is able 
to maintain (Hume, 1748/2004, p. 94). Whatever we 
receive through our senses must be an illusion, and 
truth can be revealed only through particular 
intellectual insight or light, as Descartes (see, for 
example: Meditation II, 1641/1986, §16) and Spinoza 
(Ethics, Part II, 1677/2007, §§40-47) believe.  
 
What do we gain by rejecting substance? On the 
epistemological level, we get rid of something that 
does not help us to explain the world around us but 
rather leads us to severe scepticism. It does not mean 
that “substance” has disappeared from the scene; it is 
very convenient and practical to relate different 
accidents which happen normally to co-occur to the 
same substance, especially when we come to moral 
actions that we must ascribe to a particular person, to 
an “identical self”. To use modern terminology, 
Hume implies time and again that our language has a 
performative and not only a denotative function. By 
these means, our language can fill the epistemological 
void: we use words that denote nothing but what they 
themselves create, namely perform;7 for example, in 
                                                 
7 For example: “So it naturally happens, that after frequent 
use of terms, which are wholly insignificant and 
unintelligible, we fancy them to be on the same footing with 
the prec’dent [i.e. terms which do denote something], and to 
have a secret meaning, which we must discover by 
reflection” (Hume, 1739-40/2003a, p. 160); “… all the 
cases of the causality, independent reality, and 
continuity of the same identical object. 
 
On the theological level, dispelling substance negates 
the monotheistic concept of God as the one sole 
substance that exists beyond and above what occurs 
on earth. This must, of course, have far reaching 
implications in the moral and political arena. In The 
Natural History of Religion (1757/2000b), Hume 
gives polytheism precedence over monotheism for not 
only epistemological and ontological, but also moral, 
reasons. The attempt to reduce everything to one 
single substance entangles us in unsolvable contra-
dictions (ibid., p. 167). But superstitious religion, 
which consists of a plurality of deities being only 
slightly superior to the human being, is tolerant 
towards other religions and deities. Monotheism is 
intolerant and cruel (ibid., p. 145). The concept of one 
single absolutely sublime perfect God leads to 
submission, abasement, cowardice and passive 
dependence upon the one almighty God; it annihilates 
everything that constitutes the best of the human 
spirit. On the other hand, “where the gods are 
conceived to be only a little superior to mankind and 
so to have been, many of them, advanced from that 
inferior rank, we are more at our ease, in our 
addresses to them, and may even, without 
profaneness, aspire sometimes to rivalry or emulation. 
Hence activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of 
liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people” 
(ibid., p. 149).8  
 
So Hume has shown us that he has at least two good 
reasons to reject substance. From an epistemological-
ontological perspective, it yields nothing that can help 
us to account for the world around us; eventually, too, 
it leads to scepticism. From a moral perspective, 
although substance is a factor we cannot avoid in 
ascribing moral or immoral deeds to a particular 
person, it becomes detrimental the moment we 
elevate it to the rank of God or a monarch. As such, 
as we have seen, it is the ground for submission, 
intolerance and self-effacement. 
 
Arguments from Design 
 
In this section, I am going to trace the way in which 
Hume destroys the idea of substance. I will focus 
                                                                          
nice and subtle questions concerning personal identity can 
never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as 
grammatical than as philosophical difficulties” (ibid., p. 
187; my emphasis).   
8 There are, of course, more far reaching implications on the 
political level as well. While I am not familiar with that 
issue, Livingston gave an interesting talk on this topic at the 
last meeting of the Hume Society in 2006 in Koblenz. 
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mainly on two interlocutors – Cleanthes and Philo. 
Cleanthes represents and defends the design 
argument: he tries to infer the existence of a God-
designer from the design he discerns throughout the 
world. Philo admits that design pervades everything, 
but argues that we cannot infer the existence of God 
from it.  
 
The design-argument is based on an analogy drawn 
between designer and designed on the human level 
(for example: architect and house) and designer and 
designed on the natural level. The designer on the 
natural level is missing, but we are (according to the 
supporters of the design-argument) compelled to infer 
the designer from the overwhelming evidence we 
encounter everywhere of nature as designed. The 
closer the analogy between the cosmos and human 
artifacts is, the more convincing the analogy between 
a creating God and the human mind is supposed to be. 
The discussion is thus concentrated around the 
missing side of the analogy: is it necessary to fill it 
with God or are there better alternatives?             
 
Cleanthes begins with the design and order (which he 
calls “machine”/s) we encounter all around, with the 
perfect adapting of means to ends: “the curious 
adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, 
resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the 
productions of human contrivance; of human designs, 
thought, wisdom, and intelligence. … Since therefore 
the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by 
all rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and 
that the author of Nature is somewhat similar to the 
mind of man ...” (Hume, 1779/2000a, p. 203).  
 
Philo replies that the only reasonable and permissible 
scope for our analogies is our experience (ibid., p. 
204ff). That is, only things that either have occurred 
together in the past many times or that resemble them 
are allowed to be one side of the analogy. Only the 
fact that two things always have occurred together, 
Philo goes on to say, allows us to infer that, when we 
see the first occurring, the second will occur, or, when 
we see similar occurrences, to infer or await similar 
results. But the occurrence of one singular universe 
we experience, Philo points out, can never stand as 
the side of an analogy. Philo concludes: “To ascertain 
this reasoning, it were requisite, that we had 
experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not 
sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities 
arise from human art and contrivance … ” (ibid., p. 
210; emphasis added).  
 
Recurrence, according to Philo, is the keystone in the 
analogy: singular occurrence is not sufficient to allow 
us to apply an analogy. The “same” event should 
return many times – and the more often it takes place, 
the better and more compelling is the analogy. As 
Philo puts it: “Like effects prove like causes. This is 
the experimental argument; and this … is the sole 
theological argument. Now it is certain, that the liker 
the effects are, which are seen, and the liker the 
causes, which are inferred, the stronger is the 
argument” (ibid., p. 226).  
 
Philo’s reply suffers from two problems:  
 
I. It is definitely not the case that we simply see two 
things occurring together and, seeing the one, infer 
the other, or from similar occurrences infer similar 
conclusions. Having no definite perspective at hand, it 
is nonsense to speak about analogy. For example, a 
“ship” and a “house” (which are the examples 
Cleanthes and Philo are discussing) as such have 
nothing in common. In respect, however, of their 
being planned and built by human beings, they have 
much in common. So what is Philo’s criterion in 
claiming that there is no analogy between human 
products on the one hand and God’s creations on the 
other? Well, actually it is Cleanthes, the supporter of 
the design argument, who had to provide the criterion. 
But he does not provide it. So Philo, not saying it 
explicitly but yet implying it, assumes that it is the act 
of creation: we have seen many times the creation of 
houses and ships, so we are allowed to infer an 
architect or planner. But Cleanthes did not mention 
creation as criterion; he has so far talked only about 
the design or plan that we discern in the case of both 
human products and the things of nature around us. 
What is implied is the intentional act and planning. So 
it can well be the case that God planned the world yet 
did not create it, or that He controls it from eternity to 
eternity without the act of creation; God is, in other 
words, an inherent principle. This alternative is far 
from perfect, but Cleanthes can still adhere to a plan 
without creation, thus shifting the target and causing 
Philo to misfire. (It is also true that design, namely 
the experience of order, implies a “biased” particular 
perspective or point of view. It is by no means the 
case that somebody coming from another planet or an 
absolutely different culture would share with us the 
same sense of design and order. Both Cleanthes and 
Philo, being similarly “biased”, share the same 
perspective of design.)  
 
II. Philo repeats his thesis that, in the case of human 
products such as houses, we have had recurring 
experiences of them as having been planned 
intentionally, while, in the case of the worlds, we 
have no recurring experience of their creation. Philo 
asks Cleanthes: “Have worlds ever been formed under 
your eye?” (ibid., p. 212) Let us take it slowly: the act 
of creation he is talking about is a singular one; it has 
occurred only once and it is not the case that God 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 2   September 2008  Page 6 of 12 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
creates and annihilates worlds at whim or on a regular 
basis. (God’s repeated acts of creation in Descartes’s 
Meditation III are designed to maintain the continuity 
of the same identical world).9 And this holds true for 
every and any theory of creation – be it through God 
or some physical event such as the big bang. In 
addition, consciousness is subsequent rather than 
prior to creation: each of us was present in his own 
creation (conception and birth), but can never be 
conscious of it. So Philo’s demand for a recurring 
experience of creation is simply absurd. But wherein 
exactly does this absurdity consist? In Cleanthes’s 
demand to analogize human creation and planning 
with God’s, or in Philo’s assumption that a one-time 
event cannot be one side of an analogy?  
 
Be it as it may, Philo has no appropriate vocabulary at 
hand to articulate this critique; he can articulate 
meaningfully neither recurring creations nor co-
present consciousness during the act of creation. And 
Cleanthes would have encountered the same inability, 
were he entrapped into trying to answer Philo’s 
arguments on this matter. Cleanthes, however, 
reiterates his thesis of a transcendental personal God. 
He must personify and keep God transcendental in 
order to maintain the analogy. Demea then accuses 
Cleanthes of anthropomorphism: the difference 
between God and ourselves is so great that any 
attempt to draw an analogy between God and us will 
necessarily entangle us in anthropomorphism. 
Cleanthes, on his part, accuses Demea of mysticism 
(see Dialogues III-IV): if you can say nothing about 
God, He disappears in a mystical cloud.  
 
These difficulties are aporetic, and there is no clear 
victory on either side. But eventually it will help to 
dismiss and dispel the pure substance, that is, the 
transcendental God at the peak of the hierarchy. For it 
seems that all the problems revolve around the 
introduction of this notion  into the discussion. 
 
Philo’s next argument against the transcendental God 
shows that, if we accept Him as first reason and 
cause, we will be entangled in infinite regress:  
 
How therefore shall we satisfy ourselves 
concerning the first cause of that Being, 
whom you suppose the Author of Nature, 
or, according to your system of Anthropo-
morphism, the ideal world, into which you 
trace the material? But if we stop and go no 
farther, why go so far? Why not stop at the 
material world? How can we satisfy 
ourselves without going to infinitum? And 
after all, what satisfaction is there in that 
                                                 
9 See Descartes (1641/1986, §31). 
infinite progression? (ibid., p. 222)  
 
Now, Philo continues, if we say that the ideal world 
does not depend on another designer, and so on to 
infinity, but instead orders itself, then why does not 
the same apply to the material world? “An ideal 
system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, 
is not a whit more explicable than a material one, 
which attains its order in a like manner” (ibid., p. 
225). In other words, we can explain our surroundings 
quite well without the aid of the transcendental realm, 
so why do we need it at all, if it causes so much 
trouble on both the epistemological and ontological 
level (causality)?  
 
There is no cut-clear solution here, for a self-ordering 
universe is also not without problems, giving rise to 
questions about the preconditions and optimal timing 
and the co-occurrence of these to enable the further 
self-development of the universe. Philo’s resolution is 
thus pragmatic, explanation either with or without 
transcendence being problematic. But where do we 
find a better solution? Once we leave our mundane 
realm and go transcendental, we are in a predicament 
(ibid., p. 222). Philo goes on to attack the assumption 
of transcendence in two ways: (1) We have an 
experience of both ideas and matter which become 
organized without an agent – as in the case of 
generation and vegetation, where organization and 
order prevail without an organizer. The advantage 
here is that the principle is not transcendental or 
“located somewhere” (let us say, in the roots or 
leaves), but instead is dispersed, as Philo claims. (2) It 
is by no means clear why Cleanthes ascribes order to 
the transcendental realm of thought, because, in the 
case of madness and distortion, we see thoughts and 
ideas distorted without any order (ibid., p. 223).  
 
Both Philo’s prongs are directed against the 
transcendental God as well as against the pure mind. 
It is hence very curious that Cleanthes both accepts 
the pragmatic solution and yet maintains his claim 
that design depends on a transcendental God: “You 
ask me, what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I 
care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity, 
and here I stop my enquiry” (ibid., p. 224).  
 
Both Cleanthes and Philo have better munitions in 
their arsenal that they do not use. Cleanthes could 
have retorted that the optimal conditions and timing 
that enable good development and growth are by no 
means clear without a transcendental God. How is it 
that exactly the essential and necessary conditions are 
laid ready there for the organism to start growing and 
developing? Philo’s infinite regress is a sword that 
cuts both ways. So Cleanthes could throw the onus 
back on him by saying that only a transcendental God 
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could halt an infinite regress, as Craig (2002) does 
with his version of the Kalam cosmological argument. 
(Craig’s point is that, without an act of creation, we 
would get an “actual infinite” – which is a 
contradiction in terms, as he shows with the aid of 
Hilbert’s hotel-paradox.)10 Philo, on the other hand, 
could say that it is by no means clear in which way 
God or pure mind can exert influence and work on 
nature. Philo does indeed claim this later at the end of 
Dialogue VIII (ibid., p. 248).  
 
Either way, we encounter the problem of how to halt 
the infinite regress. But, once Philo has shown that 
adding a transcendental God would not do this, he has 
scored better than Cleanthes. He shows, in other 
words, the epistemological and ontological 
redundancy of a transcendental God. “To multiply 
causes, without necessity, is indeed contrary to true 
philosophy” (ibid., p.  229).      
 
Philo’s next critique of the analogy runs as follows: 
The universe, as revealed to us in modern times with 
the invention of the telescope and the microscope, is 
immense. Compared to it, human production and 
activity is minuscule. So how can one draw analogical 
lines between an enormous universe on the one hand 
and paltry human production on the other (ibid., 
Dialogue V)? Philo sums up his argument: “It is still 
more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a 
cause from our experience of the narrow productions 
of human design and invention” (ibid., p. 227). 
 
Once again, it is a question of a definite perspective. 
From which perspective does Philo criticize the 
analogy: the immensity of one side or the smallness 
of the other? This would be very weak.11 (What, for 
example, is the relation between the size of one atom 
and the whole body?) Now, if the perspective is the 
ordered harmony we discern everywhere (and this is 
definitely Cleanthes’s point), then why is this analogy 
not good? After all, do we not see order everywhere? 
If we take it slowly, we see that, either way, this 
analogy seems to lead to a dead end. If one tries to 
reject the analogy, one should point out more chaos 
than order in the universe. This is actually what Philo 
will try to do in discussing the problem of evil in the 
world. As Plantinga (1990) shows in such a masterly 
manner in “The Problem of Evil”, there is no logical 
contradiction in holding the existence of both an 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Craig (2002, pp. 92-113). 
11 Philo repeats this strange analogy: “For as the cause 
ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, 
so far as it falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what 
pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that 
attribute to the divine Being?” (Hume, 1779/2000a, pp. 
227-228).  
almighty God and of evil in the world. So, the 
contradiction must be discerned on the empirical 
level. And here is the dead end, because we do not 
have the all-encompassing empirical perspective 
required to claim that there is more chaos than order. 
(Philo would nevertheless be absolutely right to claim 
that we also lack the vocabulary to state that dying 
babies in Africa or six million Jews murdered by the 
Nazis are part of a necessary benign Divine plan. 
Compare the critique Voltaire, 1759/1986, ascribes to 
Leibniz in Candide). Let us go the other way and 
assume that we discern more order than chaos in the 
universe. Now, we could use this claim only if we 
could take a step back from the two sides that are to 
be compared. For example, I can prove and compare 
the achievements of two different computer 
programmes; I can compare the bad and the good 
deeds of one person or of a few persons. But how 
could I take a step back and compare the universe 
with the human being? Is it not a fact that the universe 
is the precondition of how a human being conceives 
it? The answer is either yes or no. If yes, what reason 
it there to claim (as Cleanthes does) that more order 
than chaos can be discerned? If no (i.e. order is 
nothing but our own projection), we remain with the 
same problem.     
 
We have just bumped up again against an aporia. 
Philo cannot push his critique further without being 
involved in the problems pointed to above. Cleanthes 
cannot reply to his critique without being entangled in 
the same trap. But Philo can still contend that, once 
we have eliminated the transcendental God from our 
discussion, we are free of all those problems.  
 
Another two critiques that Philo turns against the 
analogy sharpen the lack of a definite perspective in 
which the analogy is treated by the interlocutors. First 
of all, Philo claims that the mind with which we are 
familiar is finite, while the mind we want to analogize 
(i.e. God’s) is supposed to be infinite (ibid., Dialogue 
V). This critique is, of course, very weak without a 
definite perspective: we can, for example, compare a 
biological mind with an artificial one. Secondly, Philo 
does not see any reason why we should not analogize 
a plurality of gods rather than a single one (ibid). 
Well, once we let God become involved with number 
(be it even one), we open the door to polytheism, that 
is, of relating singularity to plurality. God is beyond 
enumeration, as Maimonides (1190/1974, §§50-58), 
for example, would say. But, leaving that critique 
aside, what reason has Philo to claim it, after having 
already declared that “To multiply causes, without 
necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy” 
(Hume, 1779/2000a, p. 229)?  
 
Although Philo’s arguments are far from convincing, 
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he has the option to throw the blame on Cleanthes and 
say that, since he has no better solutions to those 
problems, it is the insertion of the transcendental 
substance that introduces those problems into the 
discussion. Once we have dropped the idea of 
substance, we are free of the problems.   
 
In discussing true religion, Philo proposes his own 
“analogy” to account for the order we discern 
everywhere. It is not the analogy of a human designer 
with a transcendental divine one, but rather with an 
inherent principle, as is the case in the zoological 
realm. There is, of course, no longer any analogy 
once the transcendental substance has disappeared.  
 
Now if we survey the universe, so far as it 
falls under our knowledge, it bears a great 
resemblance to an animal or organized 
body, and seems actuated with a like 
principle of life and motion. A continual 
circulation of matter in it produces no 
disorder: a continual waste in every part is 
incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy 
is perceived throughout the entire system: 
and each part or member, in performing its 
proper offices, operates both to its own 
preservation and to that of the whole. The 
world, therefore, I infer, is an animal, and 
the Deity is the SOUL of the world, 
actuating it, and actuated by it. (ibid., p. 
232) 
 
The core of this “analogy” is that we can never 
experience “mind without body” (ibid., p. 233).12 So, 
according to Philo, there is reason to endorse 
immanent principle but not transcendental pure mind. 
What this implies is a dispersed order or reason. Now, 
the mental is something we experience only in the 
first person; it is what Russell (1927/2008) calls 
“knowledge by acquaintance”. To say that we do not 
have an experience of “pure mental acts”, as intention 
or personal dislike, for example, is therefore simply 
wrong. Philo leaves aside the principal impossibility 
to relate mental to corporeal acts. And, had he 
continued to develop this line of thought, he would 
probably have entangled himself with another non-
commonsensical mystical metaphysical doctrine: 
monism. His point is, however, to suggest a better 
analogy, one that bears greater similarity to the 
human creature: order and life achieved through the 
will to survive and to preserve.13 But Cleanthes 
refuses to admit the possibility of an immanent 
dispersed principle. He claims:  
                                                 
12 Compare also Hume’s “Of the Immortality of the Soul” 
(1783/2003b).  
13 Compare also Dialogue X. 
… the analogy [with animal] [is] also 
defective in many circumstances, the most 
material: no organ of sense; no seat of 
thought or reason; no one precise origin of 
motion and action. In short, it seems to 
bear a stronger resemblance to a plant than 
to an animal, and your inference would be 
so far inconclusive in favour of the soul of 
the world. (ibid., p. 234; emphasis added) 
 
The thesis of “seat of thought or reason” would 
entangle Cleanthes in irresolvable problems. Philo 
goes on to claim against Cleanthes that the world 
consists of four principles: “Reason, Instinct, 
Generation, and Vegetation” (ibid., p. 240). He asks 
why Cleanthes wants to give reason primacy over the 
other principles.  
 
Philo’s goal is clear: to dismiss God as a 
transcendence factor from the discussion. Philo 
explains how the universe can function just as well 
without a first transcendental reason:  
 
Instead of supposing matter infinite, as 
EPICURUS did; let us suppose it finite. A 
finite number of particles is only 
susceptible of finite transpositions: and it 
must happen, in an eternal duration, that 
every possible order or position must be 
tried an infinite number of times. This 
world, therefore, with all its events, even 
the most minute, has before been produced 
and destroyed, and will again be produced 
and destroyed, without any bounds and 
limitations. No one, who has conception of 
the powers of infinite, in comparison of 
finite, will ever scruple this determination. 
(ibid., p. 244)  
 
In other words, a finite mass of matter in infinite time 
must undergo every possible combination. (This 
strange theory is one of the trademarks of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy; see The Will to Power, 1901/1996, 
§§1053-1067.) Add to this the tendency of 
perseverance and it follows that the best combination 
is the one that perseveres (ibid., p. 245). As to 
Demea’s question about first cause, about the first 
agent who sets everything in motion, Philo gives three 
different answers: (1) Matter itself can initiate motion 
(ibid., p. 244); (2) “The beginning of motion in matter 
itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication 
from mind and intelligence” (ibid., pp. 244-245); (3) 
“… why may not motion have been propagated by 
impulse through all eternity, and the same stock of it, 
or nearly the same, be still upheld in the universe?” 
(ibid., p. 245). On close examination, however, we 
see that only the third answer is relevant to the thesis 
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Philo pursues and defends here, that is, a finite mass 
of matter in an infinite span of time. Philo’s first 
answer implies that there is a beginning in time, while 
his second answer suggests that, either way, we will 
come up with aporia. Philo’s goal is to explain the 
order in the universe without appealing to a first 
transcendental agent. There is no beginning, no act of 
creation, which would invite questions regarding an 
agent. And still the thesis is far from clear: how could 
the same combination return in different temporal 
periods? And why does infinite time not “infinitize” 
matter – or vice versa: why does finite matter not 
“finitize” infinite time? But linear infinity would 
entangle him with the paradoxes of the set theory 
according to which an actual infinity is a 
contradiction in terms, as Craig (2002) demonstrates 
with the aid of Hilbert’s hotel-paradox. Linear 
finitude, on the other hand, would mean a 
transcendental agent, that is, a creator. The thesis 
Philo pursues here is so problematic and weak, 
whichever way we look at it, that it is amazing that 
neither Cleanthes nor Demea tries to rebuff it right 
away.  
 
Philo’s arguments are unconvincing – the epitome of 
astute syllogisms. But he can always claim that 
inserting God or a transcendental substance would not 
make it any better. He can always claim that 
paradoxes appear once we try to transgress the scope 
of our mundane experience and posit pure reason or a 
transcendental substance.  
 
The deflation and evaporation of the transcendental 
substance clears the way for the discussion regarding 
true religion. Is religion thinkable without a 
transcendental God? Are moral principles thinkable 
without a transcendental God? Is human society 
thinkable without a transcendental God? In my 
opinion, it is precisely this discussion – and not the 
epistemological-ontological – that is the climax of the 
text. For, once the subject of any epistemological-
ontological discussion (that is, the transcendental 
substance) has been removed, it would be futile to 
adhere to it. And this discussion is the climax in that 
it is only at this point that it becomes clear why 
Cleanthes and Philo cling so dogmatically to their 
starting points even though they have not really 
defended them well. Both admit the wonderful 
harmony and order that pervades the world, and both 
have their own concept of religion. But, while the one 
thinks that only religion without a transcendental God 
is true and advantageous to society, the other thinks 
that only an anthropomorphic religion – that is, only a 
religion with a transcendental God achieved through 
analogy to human beings – is either possible or 




Dialogue XII turns out to be the climax of the whole 
text, because it reveals for the first time the real 
meaning behind Cleanthes’s and Philo’s theses. 
Cleanthes has been representing the analogical 
inference from the order and design found in nature to 
a transcendental substance. Philo, in contrast, has 
been representing the thesis of an inherent order. He 
pretends to represent another kind of analogy – to 
animal and to plant life – but this is in fact no longer 
an analogy, and instead merely points to the same 
principles being found in the different species on 
earth. Philo has been corroborating his thesis by 
negating transcendental substance. As we have seen, 
his arguments are far from being perfect and flawless, 
but Cleanthes fails to answer and rebut them. So why 
does Cleanthes keep doggedly repeating his failed 
analogy thesis and the idea of a transcendental 
substance? Philo’s plant-life alternative is also not 
free of bugs and problems (see also ibid., pp. 242 & 
244). Prima facie, it is all about an epistemological-
ontological issue or way of explaining the world as it 
is with regard to our way of knowing it. But this 
interpretation is very weak. Firstly, Cleanthes’s 
epistemological-ontological way has failed and Philo 
has not managed to prove that his alternative is better. 
Secondly, after the transcendental substance has been 
eliminated, there can no longer be any debate between 
Cleanthes and Philo about the analogy.  
 
The fact of the matter is that both Cleanthes and Philo 
are led solely by their moral attitudes: Cleanthes 
thinks that, without a transcendental substance – in 
other words, without hope for afterlife and ultimate 
justice – our moral and social structure must collapse: 
 
My inclination, replied Cleanthes, lies, I 
own, a contrary way. Religion, however 
corrupted, is still better than no religion at 
all. The doctrine of a future state is so 
strong and necessary a security to morals 
that we never ought to abandon or neglect 
it. For if finite and temporary rewards and 
punishments have so great effect, as we 
daily find; how much greater must be 
expected from such as are infinite and 
eternal? (ibid., p. 283)   
 
So, the crux of the discussion is by no means 
epistemological-ontological, but rather moral. It is not 
at all a question of whether there is a God and 
whether we can know Him or not, but rather of 
whether it is advantageous to society to believe and to 
assume that He exists rather than not.  
 
Philo’s greatest concern is also not epistemological-
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ontological, but, instead, moral. The assumption of a 
transcendental substance leads necessarily to a 
personification of God. This leads directly to 
submissiveness and to degrading our freedom and 
free reason. It results in terror rather than in freedom 
and happiness; that is to say, it works against our 
natural inclinations:  
 
It is contrary to common sense to entertain 
apprehensions or terrors, upon account of 
any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that 
we run risk hereafter, by the freest use of 
our reason. … To know God, says Seneca, 
is to worship him. All other worship is 
indeed absurd, superstitious, and even 
impious. It degrades him to the low 
condition of mankind, who are delighted 
with entreaty, solicitude, presents, and 
flattery. (ibid., pp. 290-291)    
 
Religion, according to Philo, overturns the natural 
order, in that it replaces the closest with the farthest: 
in the place of our most natural inclinations to do 
what is good and avoid the bad, it gives us a distant 
transcendental substance. In that way it destroys 
moral principles: 
 
… where the interests of religion are 
concerned, no morality can be forcible 
enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The 
sacredness of the cause sanctifies every 
measure which can be made use of to 
promote it. 
 
The steady attention alone to so important 
an interest as that of eternal salvation is apt 
to extinguish the benevolent affections, to 
beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And 
when such a temper is encouraged, it easily 
eludes all the general precepts of charity 
and benevolence. (ibid., p. 286)  
 
As Philo claims, the oaths in the “custom-house” are 
respected and held not because of fear of God, but 
rather because of a natural and cultivated respect and 




It has turned out that the heart of the discussion 
cannot be epistemological-ontological. On the one 
hand, Cleanthes takes no serious trouble to defend the 
design arguments against Philo, whose critiques are 
by no means flawless and logically sound. Philo, on 
the other hand, does not really do better with his 
alternative, and repeatedly recommends no more than 
scepticism, calling us “to suspend all judgment with 
regard to such sublime and such extraordinary 
subjects” (ibid., p. 291). The issue is a moral one, 
because it does not end with the failure of the design-
argument, as many commentators believe to be the 
case (see Everitt, 2005, pp. 85ff; Mackie, 1982, p. 
133). Instead, it remains open to further discussions 
whether religion as social fact, and as such detached 
from any epistemological-ontological aspects, is 
advantageous and beneficial to society or detrimental 
to it. None of the interlocutors in the Dialogues 
represents Hume on a one to one basis. Each of them 
contributes to the real crux of the Dialogues – that is, 
the moral issue. And it is Demea, with whom 
probably no commentator would want to identify 
Hume, who introduces the moral issue into the 
discussion right at the beginning of Dialogue I, in that 
way determining the moral question as the most 
dominant in the Dialogues. It seems that, for Hume, 
the sole relevant question regarding religion is the 
moral one (see Segev, 2008). And this question is 
never allowed to be decided on the epistemological-
ontological level. Philo prescribes some interdictions 
to ensure that we will never extend the analogy 
between nature and artifacts to a transcendental 
substance, and therefore that God will never play a 
role and will never affect our conduct or decision-
making (Hume, 1779/2000a, p. 291). The question 
regarding religion should rather be resolved on the 
social level. It should be asked whether religion is 
beneficial or detrimental to society. As Hume puts it 
in the Principles (1751/1913): 
 
Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, 
self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and 
the whole train of monkish virtues; for 
what reason are they everywhere rejected 
by men of sense, but because they serve to 
no manner of purpose; neither advance a 
man’s fortune in the world, nor render him 
a more valuable member of society; neither 
qualify him for the entertainment of 
company, nor increase his power of self-
enjoyment? (p. 108) 
 
A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his 
death, may have a place in the calendar; 
but will scarcely ever be admitted, when 
alive, into intimacy and society, except by 
those who are as delirious and dismal as 
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